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LEADING THE HORSE TO WATER: THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY




Even at the best of times, the relationship between labor and man-
agement at many firms is an uneasy truce. In this age of economic over-
haul and globalization of markets, it is hardly surprising that this truce
has broken down often. Animosity between management and labor is
particularly likely to flare up when an employer decides to subcontract,
automate, or close a part of its business. Such decisions threaten em-
ployee job security and have a significant and often devastating impact
upon the local community.' Under such a state of affairs labor's and
management's common goal of a profitable enterprise becomes a bone of
contention: the employer wants to implement changes quickly that, in its
judgment, will make its business more competitive, while the employees
resist any change that will undermine job security.
In an effort to stabilize potentially explosive situations of this sort,
Congress in 1935 passed the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter
the "Act" or the "NLRA"). 2 In doing so Congress recognized that the
employee has a stake in the company for which he works and deserves
some legally enforceable rights. As a result, if the employer makes a
unilateral decision that affects job security, it may be engaging in an un-
fair labor practice. Management may be required to effect some sort of
restitution such as backpay, which is potentially devastating because
such a ruling may not come until after all avenues of appeal have been
exhausted and several years have gone by.
3
* The author would like to thank Professor Martin H. Malin for his patient assistance with
the development of this Note.
1. For example, the decline of the Jones & Laughlin steel plant has decimated the town of
Alliquippa, Pennsylvania: the plant formerly employed 17,000 but as of 1986 its workforce totaled
only 100. The economic deterioration of the town is manifested in boarded store windows and
deserted streets in the once-bustling downtown area. Labor Law Symposium on the Globalization of
United States Industry, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 669, 682.
2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
3. See, e.g., University Health Care Center, 274 N.L.R.B. 764, 771 (1985), in which a nursing
home was deemed to have engaged in unfair labor practices by failing to bargain the decision to
reduce shifts from 8 to 7 1/2 hours. The Board ordered the facility to reinstate employees whose
hours had been cut and to pay lost wages from 1983 to the time of reinstatement.
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Employers dislike having to consult their employees before making
decisions about the future of a business. The possible consequences of
ignoring the employees' right to be consulted, however, are equally un-
pleasant. The NLRA ostensibly requires entrepreneurs to put their sen-
sibilities aside and discuss with employee representatives decisions that
have a serious impact on job security. However, judicial and administra-
tive interpretation has reduced the NLRA to an empty threat. While
employers may be forced to gamble that their unilateral decisions to par-
tially close, subcontract, or automate will withstand an unfair labor prac-
tices charge, it is a gamble that often pays off.
Congress' intent in passing the NLRA was to minimize labor dis-
putes and promote industrial democracy through the process of collec-
tive bargaining. 4 However, the courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter the "NLRB" or the "Board") have paid mere lip ser-
vice to the democratic ideal to which the drafters of the Act aspired. In
doing so, the courts and the Board have effectively sapped the strength of
the organized worker and tipped the balance struck by the Act and its
amendments 5 in management's favor.
4. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 84 (10th ed.
1986). See also Note, The Viability of Distinguishing Between Mandatory and Permissive Subjects of
Bargaining in a Cooperative Setting: In Search of Industrial Peace, 41 VAND. L. REv. 577, 581
(1988). Cox, et al. also opine that the Act was a New Deal measure designed to stimulate the
economy by increasing mass purchasing power. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, at 82.
5. Congress amended the NLRA several times in order to maintain this balance of power
between management and labor. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136, was passed in recognition of the unions' greater strength and ability to dominate the
bargaining process. Among other things, it imposed upon the unions the same duty to bargain as
had been imposed upon the employer through the original passage of the Act. The Landrum-Griffin
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, further regulated both the internal affairs of unions
and their relationship with the employer. Despite Congress' efforts, however, the Act's balance has
shifted so dramatically in favor of management that politicians and scholars alike have called for
further reform.
In 1977, Congress deliberated over the Labor Reform Act, S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House Committee on Education and Labor found that
the NLRA provided no assurances that employees who exercised their right to organize would not
be discriminated against or be denied the opportunity to work. The Committee identified several
specific problems, namely:
(1) The NLRA "allows for extensive delay in providing remedies and in holding repre-
sentation elections." Delay in the latter case means that the fairness of the election is
jeopardized by the opportunity to harass employees and fire union activists.
(2) The Act contains no mechanisms to deal effectively with noncompliance and dilatory
tactics.
(3) The NLRA's remedies serve neither to deter employers from violating the Act nor to
compensate the employees who are victims of the unlawful activity. This is because the
benefits of violating the Act exceed the costs, and "[t]he backpay provision does not redress
the actual harm inflicted on illegally fired employees. Further, employees wrongfully de-
prived of the opportunity to bargain receive no compensation at all for that loss."
H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1977).
The Labor Reform Act died on the floor of the Senate. But that, according to Harvard Profes-
sor Paul Weiler, was fortuitous since the focus of the amendment was on the remedial provisions of
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act mandates that the
employer's interest in running a profitable business be balanced against
the benefit to the collective bargaining process of submitting the decision
to negotiation. 6 Attempts by the lower courts and the Board to engage in
this balancing have met with limited success because the Court's identifi-
cation of the respective interests is too indefinite to be applied easily. 7 In
an effort to capsulize the Supreme Court's balancing test, the Board de-
veloped a test of its own. 8 Under the Board's test, if a management deci-
sion turns on labor costs it must be bargained with the employees'
representative, but management need not bargain over decisions that
constitute a change in the nature and direction of the business.9 In appli-
cation this test has been too mechanical to address properly the needs of
all parties involved 0 and has been abandoned recently by both the courts
and the Board."
The Board and the courts thus have failed to develop a test that
the NLRA. Professor Weiler opined that the necessary focus of reform is on prevention. Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 1769, 1770 (1983). Weiler attributed the decline in union membership to the employer's ability
to coerce his employees into rejecting union representation through threats and selective firing of key
union activists at crucial points in the organization campaign. Id. at 1781-86. He proposed to pre-
vent such activity by adopting a system of "instant elections." Under that system, the NLRB would
be required to conduct an election within five days of its receipt of a certification petition. Such a
"highly compressed interval" would prevent the employer from intimidating his employees into re-
jecting unionization. Id. at 1812.
Southern Methodist University Professor Charles Morris identified lack of vigorous enforce-
ment of the Act by the NLRB as a major stumbling block to realizing the objectives of the Act. He
criticized the Dotson Board for "operating on the premise that one of its primary functions is to
protect employers." Panelists Debate Merits of Current NLRB Decision at Meeting in Dallas, [CUR-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 68 at A-2 (1985).
6. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
7. The First National Maintenance Court identified the competing interests as the entrepre-
neur's ability to run a profitable business on the one hand versus the benefit to labor-management
relations and the collective bargaining process as a whole. Id. Depending upon the judge's philo-
sophical slant, these interests can be "weighed" so as to render a subject mandatory or permissive on
the same facts. See, e.g., Arrow Automotive Indus., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1987), enf denied, 853
F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
8. See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
9. Id. at 892.
10. For example, the Board decided that "turns on labor costs" meant that labor costs were the
sole motivation for the decision. If any other factor entered into the determination, the decision
became a "change in the nature and direction" of the business. See id. at n.3. Thus, all decisions
that are not attributable to labor costs are lumped under the rubric of "change in the nature and
direction" of a business, even when the decision rests on economics and does not involve either the
nature or the direction of the enterprise. See, e.g., Columbia City Freight Lines, 271 N.L.R.B. 12
(1984) (decision to close trucking terminal designed to reduce costs, maximize efficient use of equip-
ment, and minimize the impact of the loss of a major customer); Fraser Shipyards, 272 N.L.R.B. 496
(1984) (decision to close machine shop and subcontract work motivated by recession, lack of busi-
ness, and disrepair of shop).




serves well the objectives of the NLRA and the competing interests of
management and labor. Perhaps in fear of discouraging private enter-
prise and competition, the Supreme Court in particular has refused to
allocate sufficient weight to the employee's interests to foster democracy
in the workplace. This Note will examine Supreme Court and NLRB
standards in light of the purposes of the NLRA and discuss proposals
developed by various scholars that attempt, some more successfully than
others, to develop a more equitable resolution of disputes that destroy the
labor-management truce. The Note will then suggest an alternative that
combines the best features of two proposed solutions to the bargaining
dilemma.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The National Labor Relations Act
In 1935 Congress passed the Wagner Act and gave official sanction
to the labor movement. 12 By doing so Congress hoped to promote equal-
ity of bargaining power and defuse industrial conflicts.' 3 Congress
amended the Act in 1947, recognizing that the unions were using their
growing economic strength to tip the balance and to overpower manage-
ment at the bargaining table.' 4 The Act currently requires employers
and employee representatives to bargain in good faith with respect to
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' 15 Such
12. Section 7 of the Act states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... "
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
14. The Taft-Hartley amendment to § 1 states as follows:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organiza-
tions, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or
obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce through
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair
the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such prac-
tices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 89-93 for a discussion
of some of the forces that led to the passage of these amendments.
15. The text of the section, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Sec. 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
Sec. 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of
his employees ....
Sec. 8(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
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"terms and conditions of employment" are called mandatory subjects of
bargaining, for the parties are required to bargain over such topics until
they reach a stalemate, or "impasse."' 6 It is only at that point that a
party may act unilaterally to change a term or condition of employment.
B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether a decision to
subcontract bargaining unit work is a mandatory subject of bargaining in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.' 7 Fibreboard had decided to
subcontract its maintenance work in its plant to Fluor Maintenance, Inc.
Fluor had convinced Fibreboard's management that Fluor could provide
maintenance services at a lower cost than could Fibreboard's in-house
maintenance crew. Fluor would accomplish this by decreasing the work
force, lowering the benefits, and pre-scheduling the work to be done. 18
Simultaneously, the collective bargaining agreement that governed
Fibreboard's maintenance employees was due to expire, and the bargain-
ing unit's representative contacted Fibreboard's management to schedule
a bargaining session.t 9 After some delay, Fibreboard met with the union
and informed the representative of Fibreboard's decision to subcontract
its maintenance. In light of its decision, Fibreboard declined to negotiate
a new contract, but offered to answer any questions that the union might
have.
The parties met again and Fibreboard's representative explained
that in prior negotiations management had raised cost concerns and had
received concessions from other collective bargaining units within the
company but had not obtained similar relief from the maintenance crew's
unit. In an effort to reduce labor costs, the maintenance work would
henceforth be done by an independent contractor.
After the maintenance employees were terminated the union filed
unfair labor practice charges against Fibreboard, alleging violations of
sections 8(a)(l), 20 8(a)(3) 21 and 8(a)(5) 22 of the NLRA. The NLRB dis-
missed the complaint but upon petition for reconsideration found that
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
16. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962). Impasse is "a... state of facts in which the
parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472,
482 (5th Cir. 1963).
17. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
18. Id. at 206.
19. Id. at 205.
20. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "[t]o interfere with, re-
19891
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Fibreboard had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act.23 The court of ap-
peals granted enforcement and the Supreme Court affirmed.
24
The Fibreboard facts demonstrated that collective bargaining was
appropriate. Specifically, the Court pointed out that the decision to sub-
contract had not altered the basic operation of Fibreboard's business, nor
did the company plan to make any capital investments as a result. More-
over, the subcontracting merely replaced one set of employees with an-
other.25 In further support of the duty to bargain, the Court stated that
as a matter of national labor policy, Congress had determined that collec-
tive bargaining is preferable even when the employer could cut costs by
taking action without consulting the bargaining unit.
26
The Court held that subcontracting of work performed by a bar-
gaining unit is a term and condition of employment, 27 as is the resulting
termination of the unit employees. 28 Chief Justice Warren reasoned that
a primary goal of the NLRA was to promote the peaceful settlement of
labor disputes, and making subcontracting a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining served that goal "by bringing a problem of vital ...concern
within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to in-
dustrial peace."'29 Further, the fact that parties had bargained success-
fully over subcontracting showed that the subject was amenable to
collective bargaining. 30
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but was disturbed by the
implications of the Court's broad holding. 3I He proposed that the Court
limit its holding to the particular facts of the case. He declared that
"conditions of employment" are conventionally regarded as the "physi-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in See. 157 of this title." See note 12,
supra for the text of § 7.
21. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization .. "
22. For the text of § 8(a)(5) see note 15, supra.
23. The Board relied on Town & Country Mfg., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027, enf'd, 316 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1963), which deemed subcontracting for economic reasons within the scope of § 8(a)(5).
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 208.
24. Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Black, Clark, Brennan,
and White joined. Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Harlan concurred in the result.
25. 379 U.S. at 213.
26. Id. at 214. Apparently Fibreboard's attorneys argued that because the company was able to
cut costs via subcontracting, there was no need to pursue that objective through collective bargain-
ing. Id.
27. The Court did not explain how it arrived at this conclusion.
28. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 210.
29. Id. at 211.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 65:555
EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN
cal dimensions of [the] working environment. ' 32 He characterized ter-
mination not as a condition of employment but as a determination of
whether there is to be employment at all. Although he conceded that the
Board and the courts have recognized union demands for limitations on
the power to terminate as mandatory, Justice Stewart emphasized that
every decision that affects job security is not necessarily subject to
mandatory bargaining.
33
To support his point, Justice Stewart identified three categories of
management decisions: 1) decisions about conditions of employment; 2)
decisions that have an indirect and uncertain impact on job security; and
3) decisions that may imperil job security or even terminate employment,
but that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control."' 34 He stated that
decisions in the third category should not automatically be subject to the
collective bargaining process. Justice Stewart agreed with the majority
that the particular type of subcontracting involved here was subject to
bargaining because it was akin to other traditional issues of collective
bargaining,3 5 which fell within the first category. He explained, however,
that subcontracting in general is not automatically a condition of em-
ployment.3 6 Both the majority and Justice Stewart declined to go further
than this sort of "I-know-it-when-I-see-it-and-this-is-it" delineation of
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The Supreme Court did not address the subject again until 1981,
when it decided First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 37 First Na-
tional Maintenance (hereinafter "FNM") provided maintenance services
to various customers in New York City. Each job was staffed with a
separate set of employees hired specifically for that contract. FNM had a
difficult relationship with one of its customers, Greenpark Nursing
Home. Greenpark reduced FNM's fee and refused to restore it. As a
result, FNM decided to terminate the Greenpark contract and discharge
the employees who worked there.
The employees involved recently had elected a collective bargaining
representative, and when FNM refused to bargain over the decision to
terminate the contract, the representative filed an unfair labor practice
charge. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that FNM had violated
section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain in good faith over the decision and
32. Id. at 222.
33. Id. at 222-23.
34. Decisions of the latter type include, for example, investment of capital and matters relating
to the basic scope or direction of the enterprise. Id. at 223.
35. Such issues include compulsory retirement and layoffs according to seniority. Id. at 224.
36. Id.
37. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
1989]
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its effects. The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's findings
and the court of appeals enforced the Board's decision.
38
The Supreme Court reversed.3 9 Justice Blackmun first noted that
Congress did not intend to make the union "an equal partner in the run-
ning of the business enterprise ..... 40 The Court adopted Justice Stew-
art's Fibreboard categorization of management decisions41 and his
conclusion that decisions involving a change in the scope and direction of
an enterprise are not automatically subject to mandatory bargaining.
42
In addition to espousing Justice Stewart's Fibreboard analysis, the Court
developed a balancing test to determine whether such core en-
trepreneurial decisions should be subject to collective bargaining. The
Court saw the competing interests as promoting the goal of the NLRA to
bring a "problem of vital concern to labor and management within the
framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial
peace" 43 on the one hand and the employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking on the other.44 The duty to bargain would exist only
when the benefit to labor-management relations and the collective bar-
gaining process outweighed the burden on the employer in running its
business.
4 5
In applying the balancing test, the Court characterized FNM's deci-
sion as a partial shutdown of its business and determined that labor's
goal in this context would always be to stop or delay the closing. The
burden on the employer was to be measured by considering manage-
38. The Second Circuit held that § 8(d) of the Act creates a presumption in favor of mandatory
bargaining. The presumption is rebuttable by showing that the purposes of the Act would not be
furthered by imposing a duty to bargain. The Supreme Court noted that the Second Circuit erred in
enforcing without remanding "for further examination of the evidence and proper factfinding." 452
U.S. at 672.
39. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
40. 452 U.S. at 676. Justice Blackmun reasoned that although the language of the Act was
open-ended, § 8(a) was intended to place a limit upon the subjects which came within its purview.
He relied on the Court's opinion in Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1959), which stated that the language of the section imposes a limitation on subjects to
be deemed mandatory that "includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and the employees." 452 U.S. at 676 (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, 404 U.S. at
178).
41. This categorization is set forth supra, p. 561.
42. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
43. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 211. The Court did not identify which subjects would promote this
goal and which subjects would not, let alone why.
44. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the theory behind mandatory bargaining was that collec-
tive bargaining would result in decisions that are better for management, labor, and society as a
whole, and that such an ideal would not be served unless management was freed from the burdens of
collective bargaining to the extent necessary to run a profitable business. First Nat'l Maintenance,
452 U.S. at 678-79.
45. Id. at 679.
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ment's "need for speed, flexibility and secrecy in meeting business oppor-
tunities and exigencies." 46 The Court concluded that the harm to
management's ability to operate freely in deciding to terminate part of its
business outweighed the benefit to the collective bargaining process.
4 7 It
decided that the union could use the mandatory label as a tool to frus-
trate management objectives and delay the inevitable without ever in-
tending to offer solutions. 48 Although the union could offer concessions
and suggestions in the process of decision bargaining, 49 it could also do
so while mitigating the harm to the employees that the closing caused in
the process of effects bargaining. 50
The Court's opinion in First National Maintenance is detrimental to
the purposes of the NLRA in several respects. First, the Court justified
the decision by implying that mandating bargaining over partial closings
would make labor an equal partner in the business.51 What the Court
failed to recognize is that the duty to bargain does not confer anything
like equality upon labor. Management's duty is merely to bargain with
no obligation to adopt any part of labor's proposals. 52 Management is
free to act as it sees fit after it has bargained in good faith to impasse.
53
By removing the duty to bargain, however, the Court has destroyed la-
bor's ability to insist on discussing the contemplated action and to use
economic weapons to bring all of its influence to bear on the final deci-
sion. If a union were to strike in order to compel discussion over a non-
mandatory (permissive) topic, it would be committing an unfair labor
practice. 54
46. Id. at 682-83. Though Justice Blackmun identified these three factors as central to deter-
mining the extent of the burden that the collective bargaining process placed on management, he did
not show how these factors applied to FNM and what business opportunities and exigencies the
company had to meet with speed, secrecy, and flexibility.
47. Id. at 686.
48. Id. at 683.
49. Id. at 681.
50. Id. at 682. "Effects bargaining" is negotiating the way with which the employees will be
dealt, for example, amount and terms of severance pay. Such bargaining is required by § 8(a)(5)
when a decision adversely affects the employees' jobs or terminates employment.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator Walsh, articu-
lated the intended impact of the NLRA on the parties' bargaining duties: "[A]ll the bill proposes to
do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, 'Here they are, the legal representatives of
your employees.' What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to
inquire into it." 79 CONG. REC. 7648, 7660 (1935).
53. Management is protected by the philosophy that collective bargaining is "a subjective limi-
tation on the employer's entrepreneurial property rights, ostensibly only to the extent necessary to
maintain industrial peace." Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407, 408 (1988).
This means that impasse will be found in a wide variety of situations and an employer will be able to
take unilateral action safely and frequently. Id.
54. NLRB v. Wooster Div. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) ("it is lawful to insist
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Second, the Court seemed to justify its subordination of the employ-
ees' interest by stating that the employees were sufficiently protected by
the employer's duty to bargain over the effects of the decision. Effects
bargaining, the Court said, may ensure that the decision is "deliberately
considered." 5 However, once management incurs the costs of imple-
menting the decision it will be even more reluctant to follow any of the
union's suggestions. Moreover, labor's influence over the decision will be
further diminished by its inability to wield its economic weapons; a strike
against a closed plant is not very effective.
56
According to the Court, management's incentive to bargain a deci-
sion involving factors within labor's control also protects employees, for
management would voluntarily bargain with its employees if it believed
that by doing so it could keep its operation running profitably. However,
the Court ignored the fact that bargaining would cost the employer more
in terms of legal representation, employee attrition and reduced produc-
tivity than unilateral action because the employer would be forced to
disclose its intentions in order to bargain over the decision. In the end,
the employer would run the risk of strikes, sabotage, and bad publicity
that it could have avoided with unilateral action. Unless the employer
thinks that the employees are willing to make sufficient concessions
(which is unlikely since bargaining strategy usually dictates that the par-
ties demand more than they want in order to achieve their goals), there is
always a bargaining disincentive, which is why mandatory bargaining is
necessary in the first place.
5 7
Finally, the Court created a standard that is difficult to apply.
Under First National Maintenance only the collective bargaining process
and labor-management relations as a whole are equal in importance to
management's interest in running a profitable business. If the duty to
bargain burdens the latter more than it benefits the former, it will not be
imposed. Identifying and measuring the burden is fairly easy because
management can produce empirical evidence to show a burden; for ex-
ample, the company's accountants can produce projections that show
that company profits will be decreased or eliminated if management does
upon matters within the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist upon matters without
... . .).
55. 452 U.S. at 682.
56. For that matter, neither is a strike against an open one. See Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB,
321 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1963) ("An employer is under no duty to offer to bargain, after a strike
starts, about a decision to hire replacements for strikers, even on a permanent basis.").
57. This discussion is drawn from a more comprehensive study of this angle of the debate:
Note, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over Partial Termination and Plant Relocation
Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 907 (1986).
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not pursue a particular course. However, labor cannot produce any such
projections to show benefit; any benefits to the process as a whole that
would stem from bargaining over a particular issue would be speculative
at best, even if the Court had identified specific factors to show benefit.
Presumably a benefit would accrue if bargaining would promote indus-
trial peace, but industrial peace is a concept, an ideal, an elusive abstrac-
tion that defies empiricism. The union could show a history of successful
bargaining over the issue, but if management could not distinguish the
situation on its facts, it could rightly point out that eliminating the possi-
bility of a strike is more peaceful than inviting one. It is likely that an
adjudicator would conclude that his inability to discern benefit means
that none exists and that the burden on the conduct of business thus
outweighs any benefit to the collective bargaining process.
C. The National Labor Relations Board
The Fibreboard and First National Maintenance decisions thus set
forth what appears to be a simple dichotomy: management decisions
that fall outside of the core of entrepreneurial control are inside the scope
of mandatory bargaining, and those that fall within that core are outside.
However, appearances are deceptive because the two decisions are factu-
ally simple and easily reconcilable. In Fibreboard, the company was do-
ing nothing more than attempting to cut its labor costs, while in First
National Maintenance the company was severing a poor relationship
with one of its clients. Unfortunately for the NLRB, it was left with the
task of deciding controversies that were not as factually clear cut as those
two cases.
In resolving these more complex disputes, the NLRB did not bal-
ance the benefit to labor-management relations against the burden on the
employer. Instead, the Board merely reviewed each management deci-
sion and deemed it either a "subcontracting" (and therefore governed by
Fibreboard) or a "partial closing" (and thus governed by First National
Maintenance). The following cases illustrate the Board's label analysis.
In Whitehead Bros. Co. ,8 management had decided to open its own
trucking facility so that it would be able to serve its customers when
outside carriers were unavailable. The in-house operation was small and
met only five to ten percent of the company's trucking needs. By 1980
management had determined that the operation would run at a substan-
tial loss that year because the equipment was old and in need of replace-
ment. Rather than absorb that loss, the company decided not to replace
58. 263 N.L.R.B. 895 (1982).
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the equipment. The company shut down its in-house operation and gave
its business to outside firms.
5 9
The Board characterized the company's decision as a subcontracting
of bargaining unit work (and thus as a mandatory subject of bargaining)
for several reasons. First, the company merely had replaced one group of
employees with another. Second, it rejected the possibility of a capital
investment. Third, labor costs were one factor in the company's deci-
sion, and labor costs are amenable to collective bargaining. Finally, the
company's decision did not constitute a change in the scope or direction
of its business. 60 Thus, even though the company was going to lose
money, not because of labor costs but because of equipment costs over
which the bargaining unit had no control, it was required to bargain over
the decision with the union. Under the First National Maintenance anal-
ysis, such a decision would be characterized as "one that had a direct
impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated . . . but
had as its focus only the economic profitability of" the company. 61
Even more so than Whitehead Bros., the Board's decision in Bob's
Big Boy Family Restaurants62 exemplifies the Board's difficulty with ap-
plying Fibreboard and First National Maintenance. Bob's Big Boy sup-
plied its restaurants via a commissary system. One division of the
commissary processed shrimp, and the employees there would defrost,
cut, and bread the shrimp and then pack it in boxes and refreeze it for
distribution to the restaurants.
The company decided to discontinue the shrimp processing division,
and the Administrative Law Judge found that the decision was motivated
by the rising price of raw shrimp and the problems the company encoun-
tered in trying to maintain the grading size of the shrimp, which affected
portion control. Fishking Processors, Inc. took over the company's
shrimp processing operations and, as part of the agreement, purchased
some of the equipment Bob's Big Boy had used. The Administrative
Law Judge determined that the company had decided to get out of the
shrimp processing business altogether and that the company had no duty
to bargain the decision.
63
The Board overruled the Administrative Law Judge, stating that the
question of whether a management decision was a mandatory subject of
bargaining depended on whether it could be characterized as a decision
59. Id. at 896.
60. Id. at 898.
61. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
62. 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
63. Id. at 1377.
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to subcontract unit work or to close part of its business. 64 The Board
found that the company had engaged in subcontracting of its shrimp
processing business rather than a partial closing of its food preparation
business. In reaching its conclusion, the Board relied on the fact that the
company did not change the direction of its business; it still supplied
shrimp to its restaurants. Nor did the company engage in immediate
capital restructuring and investment; it merely sold some of its process-
ing machines to Fishking, and it did so at a leisurely pace. Finally, the
company's reasons for subcontracting, rising production costs and qual-
ity control, were amenable to the bargaining process. 65
The dissent agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's characteri-
zation of the company's decision and noted inconsistencies with the ma-
jority's reasoning in prior rulings. 66 The dissent criticized the majority's
ruling as "a semantic broadening of the term 'business' "67 and pointed
out that such a definition was a direct contradiction of the facts and hold-
ing of First National Maintenance, in which the Court characterized the
decision as a partial closing even though FNM stayed in the cleaning
business.
68
The Board eventually abandoned its label analysis. In Otis Elevator
Co. 69 (hereinafter "Otis II") the Board reconsidered a ruling it had is-
sued in 1981 and developed a standard of its own as an interpretation of
the holding in First National Maintenance.
United Technologies (hereinafter "United") acquired Otis elevator
64. Id. at 1370.
65. Id. at 1371.
66. Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring and dissenting in part, pointed
out that the company's decision in General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971) to sell one of its
truck centers was characterized by the Board as a substantial change in the direction of the com-
pany's business even though General Motors continued to manufacture and sell trucks. 264
N.L.R.B. at 1373-74.
67. 264 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
68. Id. at 1374. The dissent ignored its own logical problems in that in First National Mainte-
nance the particular contract was terminated and the service discontinued, whereas Bob's Big Boy
still supplied shrimp to its restaurants.
69. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). Otis' parent company, United Technologies Corp., was recently
brought before the NLRB on § 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charges. The collective
bargaining unit alleged that United had violated the NLRA by creating a new position out of two
old ones, one of which was a unionized position, and by failing to include the new position in the
bargaining unit. United Technologies Corp., 130 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1988), enforced, NLRB v. United
Technologies Corp., 884 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (2d Cir. 1989). The second allegation was that United
had unilaterally altered a disciplinary rule, a mandatory subject of bargaining. United Technologies
Corp., 130 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1569, 1574 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Board found that United had engaged in unfair labor practices on the first charge but not
on the second. As for the first charge, the Board found that United had merely amalgamated the
two old positions because they were inefficient and the employees in the new position simply as-
sumed the duties of the two old ones. 884 F.2d at 1573. As for the second, the Board found that the
union had waived its right to bargain over the topic. The Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1574.
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in 1975. United performed three separate reviews of Otis' organization
and technology, which reviews revealed that the technology was out-
dated, and that made product designs too expensive to be competitive. 70
The reviews also showed that Otis' share of the market was declining and
that the company was selling products below cost just to remain in the
market. Moreover, Otis' research and development facility often dupli-
cated the work of another United facility. As a result, United decided to
close Otis' New Jersey facility and consolidate operations with United's
other research and development facility in Connecticut. 71 United had a
modem research facility there and had made a capital investment in new
computer facilities near its research facility to accommodate the
consolidation.
72
A plurality of the Board73 found that United's decision to close Otis'
research and development facility was not a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining because the decision did not turn on labor costs. 74 The plurality
reasoned that the question of whether a decision is a mandatory subject
of bargaining is "the essence of the decision itself, i.e., whether it turns
upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon
labor costs; not its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer alter-
natives."' 75 The Board implied that a decision did not "turn on labor
costs" (fall under the obligation to bargain in good faith as required by
section 8(d)) unless the sole reason for the decision was to reduce labor
costs.
7 6
70. 269 N.L.R.B. at 891.
71. Id. at 892.
72. Id. at 891-92.
73. Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter, Zimmerman, and Dennis decided Otis II. Mem-
bers Zimmerman and Dennis concurred in the result but put forth their own tests as to how the
mandatory/permissive lines should be drawn. See id. at 897-99 (Dennis' test); id at 900-01 (Zim-
merman's test). Thus, only Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter espoused the labor costs analysis
that is set forth in the text accompanying notes 74 to 76, infra.
74. The Board stated:
In any particular case, although perhaps not here, either the soundness of the judgment or
the value of these concerns [dated technology, uncompetitive products and duplicative re-
search experiments] might be debatable. We see no value in such a debate. Whatever the
merits of the decision, so long as it does not turn upon labor costs, Sec. 8(d) of the Act does
not apply.
Id. at 892 n.3.
75. Id. at 892.
76. The implication lies in the following passage:
As we noted before, it is also evident that labor costs often are among the considerations
which cause management to decide to alter the scope or direction of its business. The
Court in First National Maintenance ... reasoned that if labor costs were a factor, that
element of the decision could be adequately dealt with in effects bargaining. We discern no
substantial reason why this analysis is not equally applicable to other decisions which turn
upon a significant change in the nature or direction of a business.
Id. at 894.
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Two Board members, Dennis and Zimmerman, concurred. Member
Dennis' analysis was an attempt to remain consistent with First National
Maintenance and to balance the competing interests.77 The first step of
the test was to determine whether the decision was amenable to resolu-
tion through the collective bargaining process, i.e., whether the factor
over which the union had control was a significant consideration in the
employer's decision. A factor is a "significant consideration" if the union
is able to offer help or concessions that could make a difference in the
employer's decision. If so, then bargaining is required only if the benefits
to the collective bargaining process outweigh the burdens placed on the
employer, as those benefits and burdens were identified in First National
Maintenance.
78
To determine the extent of the burden, it was necessary to examine
the decision in light of the following: (a) the extent of capital commit-
ment; (b) the extent of changes in operations; (c) the need for speed; (d)
the need for flexibility; and (e) the need for confidentiality. 79 In applying
this test to the facts of the case, Member Dennis determined that United
had no duty to bargain the decision because the union had no control
over the factors that motivated the decision.80
Member Zimmerman differed with the plurality's decision in that he
thought that the employer's duty to bargain should be measured by the
amenability of the decision to resolution through collective bargaining.
Amenability would be determined by the union's ability to "substantially
mitigate the concerns underlying the employer's decision, thereby con-
vincing the employer to rescind its decision."''8 If the union has this abil-
ity and the employer cannot show a need for speed, flexibility, or secrecy,
then the obligation to bargain the decision exists.
8 2
Until mid-1987, the Board remained faithful to its labor costs analy-
sis, although in application the test has failed to address many of the
issues involved in each case. "Labor costs" have been limited to those
decisions that truly involved costs attributable to employees. 83 However,
77. Member Dennis identified these interests as job security on the one hand and the economic
profitability of the enterprise on the other. Id. at 899.
78. Id. at 897.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 899. Member Dennis went on to say that even if the union had some sort of control
over Otis' decision, for example, if labor costs had been a significant factor, the burden placed on
Otis if it were required to decision bargain would outweigh the benefits of submitting the decision to
the collective bargaining process. Thus, Otis would not be required to bargain its consolidation
decision. Id. at 900.
81. Id. at 901.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., University Health Care Center, 274 N.L.R.B. 764, 765 (1985) (employer paid its
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a "change in the nature and direction" of an enterprise has run the
gamut from decisions that were based on reduction of operating costs
84
to decisions that were based on financial losses due to a drop in the com-
pany's market.8 5
The Board had little difficulty in determining that an employer's de-
cision turned on labor costs when the facts demonstrated that factors
such as wages and benefits were instrumental in the decision to effect the
change.86 However, the Board did not always apply its Otis II test if
another approach was available. For example, in one case the NLRB
General Counsel was not required to show that a subcontracting decision
turned on labor costs when the facts were identical to the facts in
Fibreboard.8 7 Moreover, in 1987 the Board departed from a strict appli-
cation of its labor costs analysis.
88
The Board seemed to reach the conclusion that a company's deci-
sion was based on a significant change in the nature and direction of the
business whenever the motivation could not be tied directly to labor
costs. For example, the Board found that a closure motivated by reces-
sion, lack of business, and the need for large amounts of capital to mod-
ernize a machine shop was a "significant change."'8 9 It is difficult to see
nurses over $2 more than other comparable health care facilities and state legislation reduced the
amount of reimbursement for health care); Pennsylvania Energy Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1156
(1985) (employer testified that it could not afford to pay high union rates and benefits).
84. E.g., Columbia City Freight Lines, 271 N.L.R.B. 12 (1984) (company closed terminal in
order to reduce costs, eliminate duplicative services and expenditures, maximize usage of equipment
and fuel, and reduce the impact of loss of a major customer).
85. UOP, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 999 (1984) (company lost millions of dollars due to severe drop in
truck sales).
86. For example, in University Health Care Center, 274 N.L.R.B. 764 (1985), the Center's
supervisors decided to decrease the nurses' shifts by one half hour to avoid having to lay off employ-
ees. In arguing that it had no duty to bargain its decision, the Center pointed out that it paid its
Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses $2 more than comparable facilities in the state and
that the legislature had recently reduced the percentage of reimbursement for which health care
facilities were eligible. As a result the Center sustained heavy financial losses and was attempting to
meet economic concerns by shortening the shifts. Id. at 766. The Administrative Law Judge found
that the Center did not make a change in the nature and scope of its business and was thus required
to bargain the decision it had made. Id. at 767.
The Board also found that labor costs were the basis for the company's decision to lay off its
employees and subcontract its strip mining work to an outside company in Pennsylvania Energy
Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1985). The corporation's president testified that "the reason we didn't
have union men up there was that we just could not afford to remain in operation and pay those very
high pay rates and benefits." Id. at 1156.
87. Collateral Control Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 128 L.R.R.M. 1097 (Mar. 31, 1988).
88. See Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 125 L.R.R.M. 1188 (Jun. 25,
1987), enf denied, 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
89. Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 496 (1984). It is odd that a company is deemed to be
making a significant change when it is performing the same services for its customers that it always
had and is merely making procedural changes in pursuit of greater profits. See also UOP, Inc., 272
N.L.R.B. 999 (1984) (company decided to subcontract because a severe drop in sales encouraged
streamlining to promote efficiency and reduced production costs).
[Vol. 65:555
EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN
why a profitability motive is a "change" when most entrepreneurs would
consider profitability a desired constant. Equally mysterious is the
Board's decision that a company's efforts to get rid of outdated technol-
ogy in order to remain competitive was a significant "change" in the na-
ture and direction of its business.9° The desire to remain competitive is
usually an unchanging corporate goal.
The Board made the determination of mandatorily bargainable sub-
jects even more difficult when it decided Arrow Automotive Industries.91
Arrow owned plants in Hudson, Massachusetts; Spartanburg, South Car-
olina; Morrilton, Arkansas; and Vernon, California and in 1980-81 was
in the process of replacing the latter with a newly constructed plant in
Santa Maria, California. The company engaged in the remanufacture,
sale, and distribution of automotive parts, and each plant supplied its
own geographic area.92 Realizing that the collective bargaining agree-
ment between Arrow and its Hudson employees was to expire on No-
vember 30, 1980, the company and unit representatives began
hammering out the new agreement on October 22 of that year. The
union presented its demands of increased wages and benefits93 and Ar-
row's representatives counteroffered. 94 After further bargaining the em-
ployees voted to reject Arrow's offer. When the existing collective
bargaining agreement expired, the employees went on strike.
Soon after the strike was called, company officials began to contem-
plate closing the Hudson plant and relocating the work to its Spartan-
burg facility. Arrow representatives notified the union of this and
withdrew their counteroffer, and when the parties met again Arrow in-
formed the union that the reason that the company was thinking about
closing the plant was that it had lost $1,092,000 in 1980. The union
subsequently prepared a new proposal in which it capitulated to the com-
pany's withdrawn offer in all but four areas. 95 Company officials made
90. Kroger Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 462, 463 (1984). See also Inland Steel Container Co., 275
N.L.R.B. 929 (1985) (antiquated production line and cramped facilities prevented company from
producing a competitive product).
91. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 125 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1987).
92. Id. at 1190.
93. The union demanded an annual 65-cent wage increase across the board, a "substantial"
increase in compensation for truck drivers, retention of health insurance benefits with Arrow to pay
the premiums, a $2.55 increase in monthly pension payments over the three years of the contract,
and an increase in the term and amount of disability benefit coverage. Id. at 1189.
94. Arrow was prepared to give a yearly 45-cent wage increase, some improvements in truck
driver compensation, and a $1 increase in monthly pension payments. Id.
95. The union held fast with respect to pension benefits, disability benefits, the elimination of
any health insurance deductible, and the company's assumption of a pro-rata share of health insur-
ance premium increases. Id.
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no comment on the new proposal, nor did they indicate what concessions
would be necessary to keep the Hudson plant open.
Arrow's board of directors ultimately voted to close the Hudson
plant and relocate the work to the Spartanburg facility. They cited esca-
lating production costs and decline in sales as their motivation.96 The
union demanded an opportunity to bargain the decision and when the
company refused, the employees filed a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor prac-
tice charge. The Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissing
the complaint because in his view, the company had satisfied its duty,
which was to notify the union of its decision and give the union an op-
portunity to be heard.97
The Board disagreed with the judge and found that Arrow had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain the decision to
close the Hudson plant. Applying its Otis II standard, the Board found
that the decision did turn on labor costs, even though such costs were not
management's sole motivation (Arrow's northeast market was declining
and was being served more efficiently by Arrow's Spartanburg plant).
The Board said that escalating labor costs were the "major" reason for
the decision and that the decision was a "direct consequence of [Arrow's]
frustration with the lack of progress in resolving economic issues... in
contract negotiations with the Union."198
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's deci-
sion.9 9 The court emphasized the decline in the company's market share
and concomitant decline in profits1°° and pointed out that studies showed
that Arrow would enjoy a twenty-four percent increase in gross profit if
it closed the Hudson plant. 101 The court also rejected the Board's Otis II
standard as inconsistent with First National Maintenance and as unpre-
dictable, especially in this case, because the Board had not followed its
own precedent. 102 Finally, the court held that Arrow's decision to close
96. Id. at 1190.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Arrow Automotive Indust., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988). This was a
fortunate turn of events for Arrow. The Board had ordered Arrow to pay back wages to its Hudson
employees beginning on March 25, 1981 (the date Arrow notified the union of the decision to close
the Hudson plant) until the parties either reached an agreement over the decision, reached impasse,
or the union failed timely to request bargaining. 125 L.R.R.M. at 1191-92. Had the decision stood,
Arrow would have been required to pay a little over 6 years of backpay to each employee in the
bargaining unit.
100. The court explained that losses had begun in 1978 and that the owner was keeping the plant
open primarily for sentimental reasons. 853 F.2d at 224.
101. Id.
102. In earlier decisions the Board had characterized the closing of an entire facility as a
"change in basic direction or nature of the enterprise," see, e.g., Columbia City Freight Lines, 271
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the Hudson plant was a significant change in operations under First Na-
tional Maintenance and that Arrow had no duty to bargain its decision.
The court rejected the economic reasons/labor costs distinction devel-
oped in Otis II, saying that there was no basis for such a distinction in
Supreme Court precedents and that labor costs "are inescapably a part of
the economic picture of the enterprise, and management's consideration




The myriad tests developed by the Board and the Supreme Court
have failed to foster the industrial democracy that Congress hoped to
achieve through the passage of"° an amendment to'0 5 the National La-
bor Relations Act. Although the employer gambles when it makes a uni-
lateral decision that impacts heavily on his employees' job security, that
gamble often pays off. '0 6 The NLRB's labor costs analysis creates many
loopholes for the employer.' 0 7 Moreover, even if the NLRB refuses to
N.L.R.B. 12, 13 (1984) (closing of one freight terminal and transfer of work to another existing
terminal was a fundamental change); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. at 892 (closing of one research
facility and consolidation of operations with those at another location was a fundamental change).
103. 853 F.2d at 228.
104. Section 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, states in part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between indus-
tries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption,
and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of in-
dustrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions,
and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
105. See note 14, supra.
106. TIhe Act has from the beginning been interpreted in such a way as to minimize inter-
ference with managerial authority and entrepreneurial decision making. This counter pol-
icy to the Act's declared purpose of giving employee representatives a voice has become
increasingly important during the Act's development. As a result of it, the reach of collec-
tive bargaining has been limited; management's right to eliminate jobs, close down opera-
tions, and limit union access to employees has been expanded. From very early on
employees who exercised their right to strike were subject to being permanently replaced.
All of these conclusions were reached without regard to or in spite of, the language of the
statute. They reflect what might be thought of as the Act's "capitalist exemption."
J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 5 (1988).
107. See, e.g., WXON-TV, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (Mar. 31, 1988) (elimination of production
department and layoff of employees not mandatory even though employer cited falling production
revenues vis-a-vis rising production salaries as reason for decision), enforced, 876 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.
1989); Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 339, 341 (1985) (decision to close delivery facility to
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back the employer, the courts of appeal often will. 0 8
Such judicial bias would not be so significant if unions were able to
muster some economic support. However, unions have lost much of the
strength that was theirs in the 1940s. 109 Membership in unions has de-
creased at a steady rate from 23.9% of the labor force in 1947 to 19.7%
in 1978.110 In 1980 only 20.9% of the nonagricultural labor force be-
longed to a labor union."' By 1988, that figure had dropped to
16.8%.t12
Several authors attribute labor's decline to various economic fac-
tors. 1 3 These include a shift from a predominantly blue-collar, union-
oriented workforce to a white-collar service industry workforce, 1 4 the
proliferation of multinational corporations that are better able to with-
stand labor's economic assaults than their more localized counter-
parts,1 5 and the exportation of jobs resulting from the globalization of
the world's economic system.'
16
Others have a different perspective. They attribute labor's wane to
increased managerial opposition to representation elections and illegal
combat economic losses not mandatory even though management had tried to reduce costs through
layoffs and labor concessions).
108. See, e.g., Arrow Automotive Indust., Inc., 125 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1987), enf. denied, 853 F.2d
223 (4th Cir. 1988).
B. Glenn George criticized the First National Maintenance decision for creating a balancing test
and then applying it in such a way as to create a per se rule of not requiring bargaining over partial
closure decisions. George, To Bargain or Not To Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation Deci-
sions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 680 (1985). He then opined that the Board failed to further the
NLRA's policies in formulating its Otis II test, stating that in its practical application it rejects the
obligation to bargain in almost all relocation decisions, and if employers are able to avoid bargaining
by coming up with a reason aside from labor costs, they will often be tempted to fabricate those
other reasons. Id. at 693.
109. One scholar has suggested that unions have never been very strong, and even in their hey-
day their power was greatly exaggerated:
The actual balance of power was masked in the post-war period by a social compact in
which unions, as well as employers, stressed economic growth and supported sympathetic
governmental policies. A long term view would suggest that union power has always been
exaggerated and that the labor laws were often interpreted as if there were no imbalance of
power.
Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841, 870 (1985).
110. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2070, HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTIcS 412 (1980).
111. 185 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-I (Sept. 24, 1984).
112. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, VOL. 36 No. 1 EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS 225 (1989).
113. See Atleson, supra note 109; Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon Collective Bar-
gaining Relationships, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465 (1988); Comment, An Analysis of Plant Closing
Law: How to Protect Workers From the Effects of Cessation in Business While Preserving Employer
Rights, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 565 (1988).
114. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 633, 635.
115. Atleson, supra note 109, at 842.
116. Craver, supra note 114, at 641-43.
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discrimination against union activists. "17 They contend that the struc-
tural and demographic factors outlined above do not account for the de-
crease because such changes have also occurred in other Western
nations, but without the concomitant decline in union membership." 18
Several alternatives to the First National Maintenance and Otis II
tests have been developed in attempts to take judicial bias out of the de-
termination and to achieve a method of dispute resolution that is both
fair and predictable. First National Maintenance is an extrapolation of
Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence. Justice Stewart felt that all de-
cisions at the "core of entrepreneurial control" should be free from the
constraints of collective bargaining. Capital investment decisions gener-
ally fall within this "core," as do changes in the nature and direction of
an enterprise."t 9 Because Justice Stewart declined to be more definite
than this, his standard is subject to very different interpretations 120 and is
thus not a predictable measure of the scope of an employer's duty to
bargain.
Boston University Law Professor Michael Harper has defined the
"core" via his "product market principle."' 12' Under this principle all
decisions are subject to mandatory bargaining except those "that deter-
mine what products are created and sold, in what quantities, for which
markets, and at what prices."'' 22 The product market principle is based
on the theory that judges should not be the ones to define the
mandatory/permissive distinction because they tend to base decisions on
their own ideas of what is appropriate1 23 and thus develop arbitrary
rules. Professor Harper argues that this principle is consistent with the
purposes of the NLRA, i.e., that employees be allowed to engage in con-
certed efforts for their mutual benefit, 124 and with the strong "social pol-
icy [that] . . . consumers should decide which goods employers will
produce by expressing their preferences in the marketplace, unless our
general democratic institutions restrict these preferences by
117. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 233-39 (1984); Weiler, supra note 5,
at 1778-86.
118. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 117, at 226-28; Weiler, supra note 5, at 1773 n.6.
119. Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964).
120. See, e.g., UOP, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 999 (1984) (company decided to subcontract because a
severe drop in sales encouraged streamlining to promote efficiency and reduced production costs);
notes 117 to 119, supra and notes 121 to 123, infra, and accompanying text.
121. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of
Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982).
122. Id. at 1450 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. at 1448 (quoting Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957,
44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1958)).
124. Id. at 1464.
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legislation." 25
While the product market principle does provide a predictable and
facially just measure of the scope of the duty to bargain, 126 it fails to
protect employees who are the product, e.g., entertainers, athletes or arti-
sans. Such workers would be precluded from bargaining over adverse or
even unsafe working conditions when such topics define the product. 1
27
Employees of this type would be able to affect such decisions only indi-
rectly by bargaining for higher wages to compensate for substandard
conditions. Thus, although employers would lose their sweeping power
to make decisions unilaterally, the employee would also lose control over
aspects of his work that are perhaps more important than money, aspects
that affect his mental and physical well-being. Adoption of the product
market principle would be akin to throwing out the baby with the
bathwater.
An alternative that is similar in effect to the product market princi-
ple is to abolish the mandatory/permissive distinction altogether, since
the duty to bargain does not force either party to accede to the other's
wishes.' 28 However, such abolition would increase the complexity and
duration of bargaining sessions and would not protect the parties from
attack as to their bargaining strategies129 or the union from attacks on
the parameters of the bargaining unit. 130
The Second Circuit in First National Maintenance favored a rebutta-
ble presumption that a decision is mandatorily bargainable unless the
employer can show that the purposes of the NLRA would not be served
by requiring negotiation. Such a showing could be made by demonstrat-
ing that bargaining would be futile, bargaining over the decision was not
125. Id. Harper also states that the NLRA does not subordinate this policy to its own goals. Id.
126. Harper would further limit the scope of bargaining under the product market principle so
that parties could not insist on bargaining over any proposals that would allow a party to avoid its
bargaining obligation, id. at 1486, compromise the independence of the other's bargaining strategy,
id. at 1493, quibble over insignificant aspects of the form of the negotiations, id. at 1497, or force the
other party to waive its right to seek remedies from the Board or the courts. Id. at 1499.
127. For example, skimpy outfits for waitresses and reduction of injuries through modification of
the penalty system for football players would be outside of the scope of mandatory bargaining under
the product market principle. Id. at 1466.
128. This option is set out fully in Note, The Viability of Distinguishing Between Mandatory and
Permissive Subjects of Bargaining in a Cooperative Setting: In Search of Industrial Peace, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 577, 594 (1988). The author actually espouses a more radical approach, i.e., that the bar-
gaining unit be integrated into management's decisional structure so that labor and management
could work together to achieve mutual goals. Id. at 596-98.
129. For example, the employer in NLRB v. Wooster Div. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958),
conditioned any agreement on a "ballot" clause calling for a pre-strike secret vote of employees, both
union and non-union, as to the employer's last offer, which weakened the independence of the "rep-
resentative" chosen by the employees. Id. at 350.
130. See Harper, supra note 121.
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customary in the industry, or the employer was acting in the face of an
economic emergency.
1 3 1
There are several problems with this standard. First, it would be
very difficult for the employer to show futility unless it actually ap-
proached the bargaining unit with its plans. This is because the unit may
be able to create solutions that the employer would not have foreseen
without talking to the unit representatives. Thus, if the employer acts
unilaterally and the unit demonstrates in litigation that it could have of-
fered a reasonable alternative to the action the employer actually took,
the Board would have to conclude that bargaining would not have been
futile and that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by refus-
ing to negotiate with the unit. On the other hand, if the employer were
only required to show that it could not think of any solution that the
union could offer, the duty to bargain would be a nullity.
Second, although it would be easy to show custom in the industry by
the existence in collective bargaining agreements of clauses governing the
disputed issue, it would not be fair to preclude one union from insisting
on discussion simply because other unions had failed to extract agree-
ments on the same issue. Third, it is unclear how much of an emergency
would be necessary to avoid the duty to bargain. Presumably the mark
would be somewhere between economic good health and economic
death, but the point at which a "problem" would turn into an "emer-
gency" is subject to diverse interpretation.
Member Zimmerman's Otis H test, on the other hand, goes far to-
wards providing a fair and predictable measure of the scope of
mandatory bargaining. 132 That test calls for a presumption in favor of
bargaining over decisions that impact heavily on job security and for al-
lowing unilateral management decisions to stand only if the employer
can meet one of two conditions. One condition is to demonstrate to the
Board that collective bargaining would not have affected the employer's
motivation. 133 The alternative condition is to show that the circum-
stances required a degree of speed, secrecy, or flexibility that would have
been lost if it were forced to bargain the decision with the union.
134
Member Zimmerman's test is in need of modification, however, be-
cause it fails in the same way as the Second Circuit's futility prong does:
the employer could never meet a serious standard without revealing his
131. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452
U.S. 666 (1981).
132. See text accompanying notes 82 and 83, supra.
133. Otis Elevator Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. at 900.
134. Id. at 901.
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plans to the collective bargaining unit. Thus, instead of requiring a
showing of bargaining unit impotence, most decisions should be subject
to bargaining. Only decisions requiring speed, secrecy, or flexibility or
proposals governing bargaining unit integrity, compromising the inde-
pendence of bargaining strategies, or attempting to evade bargaining obli-
gations should be excluded from the scope of mandatory bargaining.
At this point it is important to make a few observations. First, the
obligation to bargain does not require the employer to agree to anything.
Management need only make a good faith effort to come to some agree-
ment with the unit representative. Even when the duty to bargain exists,
the employer still has the option to take unilateral action after the parties
have reached impasse. 35
Second, placing the burden of proof of the absence of a duty to bar-
gain on the employer protects the employer's secrets and strategies from
the public eye. The employer would be entitled to exercise its discretion
in making the initial mandatory/permissive determination but would be
restrained from acting in bad faith because its determination would be
subject to review and reversal by the Board and the courts. This place-
ment of the burden of proof would also prevent the unit representative
from playing tactical games designed to delay an inevitable decision and
from leaking the gist of the employer's plans as a parting shot of sabo-
tage. 136 This is true because the employer need not reveal its plans until
they are put into effect, if it determines that implementation requires
speed, secrecy, or flexibility that would be precluded by decision bargain-
ing. Conversely, if the union were required to demonstrate the existence
of the duty, it would be necessary to expose the very secrets the employer
needs to protect; otherwise the union could never sustain its burden.
Thus, management is in the best position to make the initial decision and
to back it up when necessary.
In addition to illustrating the failure of the First National Mainte-
nance and Otis II tests, the Board decisions discussed above illustrate the
utility of a modified Zimmerman analysis. 137 For example, in Bob's Big
Boy Family Restaurants,138 the Board focused on the "subcontracting"
and "partial closing" labels in examining the company's motivation for
135. See text accompanying note 16, supra.
136. Such a safeguard would protect management from the dangers of collective bargaining that
Justice Blackmun identified in First National Maintenance: "Labeling this type of decision
mandatory could afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to
thwart management's intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might
propose." 452 U.S. at 683.
137. See text accompanying notes 58 to 68, supra.
138. 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
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closing its shrimp processing commissary. The dissent demonstrated
that what the majority called subcontracting (and therefore mandatory)
could just as easily have been deemed a partial closing (and thus not
mandatory).13 9 Because management was motivated by wage costs, ben-
efit costs and quality control, and not by factors that called for speed,
secrecy, or flexibility, there was no need to insulate the employer from
the duty to bargain. Thus, the majority's position, t4 and not the dis-
sent's, would be proper under a modified Zimmerman analysis.
In Otis 11141 there was also no need to protect the employer. Labor
costs did play a role in United's decision to close Otis' research and de-
velopment facility, and though United's primary motivation was the
elimination of duplicative research and antiquated facilities, 142 the union
might have saved some jobs for its members, while United would have
been free to implement its decision after bargaining was concluded.
Arrow Automotive's employees could have had a definite effect on
the company's decision to close. The facts in that case show that labor
costs were a primary reason for management's decision. 143 However, the
facts also show that another motivating factor may have been that Arrow
would be able to save significant amounts of money in setting up its new
Santa Maria plant by transferring the equipment at the Hudson plant out
to California and canceling its contracts with equipment suppliers. 1" If
Arrow were able to offer some objective evidence that without speed,
flexibility, or secrecy a savings opportunity would have been foreclosed,
it would have sustained its burden of proof and properly avoided decision
bargaining. In addition, this analysis would have allowed Arrow's em-
ployees a voice in the decision to terminate their jobs if Arrow could not
sustain its burden. In this way, the democratic purpose of the National
Labor Relations Act would have been fulfilled in a manner that is pre-
dictable and sensitive to the rights of all parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the years since the Wagner Act was passed and amended, the
power of organized labor has waxed and waned as public perception,
139. See text accompanying notes 66 to 68, supra.
140. See 264 N.L.R.B. at 1371.
141. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
142. Id. at 891-92.
143. Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1190 (Jun. 25,
1987), enf. denied, 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. The Board and the Fourth Circuit disagreed as to whether this factor played a part in
the actual decision to close the Hudson plant. See Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853
F.2d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 1988).
1989]
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economic conditions, and judicial support have fluctuated. The em-
ployee's strength in relation to that of his employer is presently at a very
low ebb, and neither the National Labor Relations Board nor the courts
have done much to bolster it. Congress' intent to foster industrial de-
mocracy in order to promote peace and prosperity has fallen by the way-
side because of what one author has called "an unexamined exaltation of
the employer's interest in unfettered control over major managerial deci-
sions .... 145
The need for a clear, objective, and easily applicable standard is par-
ticularly acute since the future of both business and labor is at stake; no
one can afford to waste money to find out that they have employed the
correct standard incorrectly or vice versa. Thus, if management were
required to bargain all decisions unless it showed that such bargaining
would result in loss of necessary speed, secrecy, or flexibility, the deter-
mination of the duty to bargain could be made swiftly and accurately
without sacrificing the interests of anyone concerned.
145. Gorman, The Negligible Impact of the National Labor Relations Act on Managerial Deci-
sions to Close or Relocate, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1354, 1362 (1984).
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